Bashkortostan’s FSB have detained four suspected members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in an operation in Ufa on 27 August. The four men – identified as Yevgeniy Kulagin, Rasim Satayev, Aleksey Khamadeyev, and Aidar Garifyanov – are accused of “preparing to forcibly take power” in order to advance the organisation’s goal of establishing a “Worldwide Islamic Caliphate.” (RIA Novosti, 29 August 2013). Continue reading “FSB Detain Four Suspected Hizb ut-Tahrir Members in Bashkortostan” →

Russian authorities claim they have identified the group that attacked a car belonging to Akhmed Kotiyev, head of Ingushetia’s Security Council, in Nizhniye Achaluki on 27 August.  According to a statement posted to the Investigative Committee’s website, a group led by Artur Getagazhev and operating in Malgobekskiy Rayon carried out the attack, which left Kotiyev and his police driver dead. The Investigative Committee also claimed that the weapons used in the attack had been used to perpetrate other crimes in the republic, including attacks on police officers (Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, 28 August 2013) Continue reading “Authorities Identify Group Responsible for Ingushetian Security Chief’s Murder” →

For a recent university paper, I conducted an exploratory study into how the Caucasus Emirate uses the microblogging site Twitter. I’ve extracted some of the key points of the study for your reading pleasure — although it’s worth noting that the full paper contains more details and references the relevant literature.  This third post looks at links contained within tweets, draws some conclusions from all three posts, and suggests some avenues for further study.  See The Caucasus Emirate on Twitter — Part One for details on the study subjects, the accounts that they follow, and the paper’s definition of extremism; see The Caucasus Emirate on Twitter — Part Two for details of interactions with other users. Continue reading “The Caucasus Emirate on Twitter — Part Three” →

For a recent university paper, I conducted an exploratory study into how the Caucasus Emirate uses the microblogging site Twitter. I’ve extracted some of the key points of the study for your reading pleasure — although it’s worth noting that the full paper contains more details and references the relevant literature.  This second post looks at interactions with other users.  See The Caucasus Emirate on Twitter — Part One for details on the study subjects, the accounts that they follow, and the paper’s definition of extremism. Continue reading “The Caucasus Emirate on Twitter — Part Two” →

For a recent university paper, I conducted an exploratory study into how the Caucasus Emirate uses the microblogging site Twitter. I’ve extracted some of the key points of the study for your reading pleasure — although it’s worth noting that the full paper contains more details and references the relevant literature.  This first post looks at the part I’ve tackled briefly in an earlier blog post:  Whom the Caucasus Emirate follows on Twitter. Continue reading “The Caucasus Emirate on Twitter — Part One” →

Another day, another special operation in Dagestan.  As a result of the latest — this time in the Makhachkala suburb of Semender — security forces have reported the death of Gimry Dzhamaat leader Ibragim Gadzhidadayev.  Regional assembly head Magomedkhabib Magomedaliyev is also suspected to be among the dead. Continue reading “Scepticism and Rumours Over Gadzhidadayev Death” →

It’s interesting to see that VDagestan.com, the “official” website of the Caucasus Emirate’s Dagestani Vilayyat (Province) launched an Arabic version of its website on 1 March. This follows the group’s launch of an Arabic-language Twitter account (@VDagestan_Ar) on 28 September 2012. Continue reading “The Dagestani Vilayyat’s Arabic-Speaking Audience” →