Since September 2015, the Islamic State has claimed responsibility for 26 attacks in Russia. As much as these attacks illustrate the serious threat IS activity poses to Russia, they also highlight important limitations. Continue reading “An Overview of IS-Claimed Attacks in Russia”
Despite its early and spectacular successes in Syria and Iraq, the Islamic State (IS) has, over the last year, suffered repeated setbacks that have weakened its ability to control captured territory and implement its state-building agenda. A key aspect of IS’s strategy has been the mobilisation of supporters across Russia and the former Soviet Union. Other rebel groups in Syria have also attracted support from these areas, illustrating the need for a proper understanding of the Russian-speaking militant milieu, beyond IS’s territorial claims. Continue reading “New Report On Russian-Speaking Foreign Fighters”
The decision by the Islamic State group to proclaim a ‘caliphate’ in June 2014 was a watershed moment in the history of jihadism, but it was far from the first attempt at jihadist state-building. Examining the reasons for the failure of one such project, the Caucasus Emirate (IK) in Russia’s North Caucasus, and the demise of the regional insurgency under the banners of both IK and IS can help us better understand the relationship between a group’s ideology and its composition and operating environment.
Click here to view the rest of the article for CREST Security Review.
Earlier today, I posted a series of tweets reflecting on a claim by the allegedly Al-Qaeda-linked “Katibat Imam Shamil,” posted to Ani.mr, claiming responsibility for the 3 April terrorist attack on the St Petersburg metro. I’ve compiled the text of tweets below for convenience, although obviously the issue requires more detailed reflection.
The investigation into the 3 April terrorist attack on the St Petersburg metro has focused on a man of Central Asian origin with possible ties to Syrian rebel groups. The attack raises concerns about the threat posed both by Daesh and extremists within Russia’s sizeable Central Asian community.
Click here to view the rest of this article for RUSI.
The April 3 bombing on the St Petersburg metro was the highest-profile terror attack on Russian soil since a suicide bombing at Moscow’s Domodedovo airport in January 2011. According to Russia’s National Antiterrorism Committee, at least 14 people were killed and 49 injured by an improvised explosive device; further casualties were prevented when a second device was disarmed at another station. Days later, another bomb was found and defused in a residential building.
Click here to view the rest of this article for The Conversation.
Scholarly publications that address or make claims about the ideology of the North Caucasus insurgency post-2007.
In December 2014, several high-ranking field commanders from the Caucasus Emirate (Imarat Kavkaz, IK) pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS). Following the defection of many of the IK’s remaining commanders, IS in July 2015 established a formal branch, the Caucasus Wilayah (IS/CW), and is now the main insurgent grouping in the North Caucasus. This article argues that there are clear ideological differences in the positions adopted by the competing IK and IS/CW factions, but ideology is potentially more important in explaining the decisions of those leaders who remained loyal to the IK than those who defected – and the ideological divide was exacerbated by the communication difficulties facing groups.
Continue reading “Between Caucasus and Caliphate: Understanding the Splintering of the North Caucasus Insurgency”
Since the involvement of fighters of North Caucasian origin in the Syrian conflict was first confirmed in August 2012, the official websites of the Caucasus Emirate (IK) have struggled to balance competing interests in their reporting on Syria. In line with the movement’s alignment of insurgents in Russia’s troubled southern region with the global jihadist movement, IK websites have reported extensively on events in Syria and on the activities of groups that ethnic North Caucasians are fighting with. However, statements by the IK’s leader, Dokka Umarov, and material published to IK websites suggest concerns that the Syrian conflict could have a detrimental effect on the North Caucasus insurgency. Multiple articles have insisted that North Caucasians are obliged to fight at home and may only travel to other jihadist “fronts” if unable to do so. Judging by regional variations in IK coverage, these concerns are most acute within the Ingushetian and, possibly, Chechen sectors of the insurgency. Continue reading “The North Caucasus Insurgency’s Syrian Balancing Act”